After the Dust Settles: What are the Consequences of the End of American Power in Afghanistan. ~~ dmorista

~~ written by and posted for dmorista ~~

The U.S., certainly at least since the end of WW 2, has used a Grand Strategy that is loosely based on the “Heartland Theory”.  That is a concept first advanced in 1904 by Imperialist British Geographer Halford MacKinder in an article entitled "The Geographical Pivot of History", published in The Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, No.4, (April 1904), 421–437.  MacKinder’s original ideas have been developed and refined over the years by a variety of authors; including most notably by two American Geostrategic thinkers and theorists: Nicholas Spykman (in America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power, 1942, Nicholas Spykman, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company); and Zbigniew Brzezinski (in The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski, New York, Basic Books).  However the influence of the “Heartland Theory” was blended with the ideas advanced by Admiral and professor at the Naval War College, Alfred Thayer Mahan (in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783, Alfred Thayer Mahan, New York, Dover Publications, revised edition. Original publication date 1890).

The basic concepts of MacKinder, as later modified and developed by Spykman, and Brzezinski are shown in Map 1 here below:

MacKinder’s ideas were original and revolutionary, he basically established the field of the study of Global GeoStrategy.  He defined an area he called “The World Island” that, in its earliest iteration, included Eurasia and North Africa.  He noted that the “World Island’s” area includes the majority of the world’s population and wealth; the concept of the World Island has now be enlarged to include all of Eurasia and Africa..  Of course his division into functional areas has some odd implications.  The U.K. and Japan, two of the wealthiest and historically powerful societies, are part of the “Outer Islands”.  Western Europe, that includes Germany and France another two of the most wealthy and powerful societies over the past 150 years are located in what he called the “Inner or Marginal Crescent”.  The U.S. is located in the “Outer or Insular Crescent”.  China is located in what MacKinder defined as the “Inner or Marginal Crescent”, along with Germany and France.  Only the Russian Empire of MacKinder’s day (and its successor state the Soviet Union) is actually located in the area that he defined as the “Pivot of the World” (labeled the “Pivot Area” in Map 1 above).

However, long-winded academics do not actually decide on Geostrategic Policies, though they discuss their ideas with, or write treatises that are read by, the political figures who do.   To a large degree the academics analyzed what the Great Powers in history have actually done.  This most particularly pertains to the way the British Empire maintained and exercised its power in the period from the Napoleonic Wars until the World Wars, and to the way the U.S. has maintained and exercised its power in the period from the World Wars up to the present time.   Both the U.S., and the U.K. before it, operated largely maritime empires that depended on control of the seas for the U.K. and control of the seas and the air / near Earth Space in the case of the U.S.   The theoretical explanation of the practical operations of the two empires, British and American, are better shown in the somewhat simplified Map 2 here below:

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Both the British Empire and the American Empire largely controlled the seas around the “World Island”, largely operating along the line labeled “Sea Power” (though the U.S. was so powerful that it exercised sea power around the Americas and Australasia as well).  The U.S., that had much larger resources, did a more thorough job than the British had; but both managed to run largely Maritime Empires that used a dominant navy (British Empire) and a dominant combined Naval, Air, and near Space force to control the surface area of the oceans.  This control of the seas, and the all-important “sea-lanes” gave tremendous power and influence to both empires.  Both the U.S. and Britain maintained relatively small land forces mostly used for limited “expeditionary campaigns”.  When either empire deviated from the general Maritime plan they suffered serious consequences.  For Britain this was seen in World Wars 1 & 2; while for the U.S. the main examples are the S.E. Asian Wars and the post 9-11 GWOT wars.  Furthermore let’s note that the area in Map 2 that, changes from maroon to black, and is labelled “Land Power” can only be applied to Russia / the U.S.S.R.  It would primarily apply to the Red Army and the horrific struggle with Germany from 1941 - 1945.  And to a lesser degree to the power presence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe in the first four and a half decades following WW 2.

Another important similarity is that the dominant economic classes, in both the British Empire and the American Empire, sponsored Globalized Free Trade arrangements.  Both actually did so after they were already losing their dominance in productive and/or industrial production.  The British and American economic elites profited from financial manipulations and strategies they used as the Globalize Free Trade system developed; but the main beneficiaries were other societies led by capitalist classes that were focused on productive and industrial capital.  So during the period from the late 1800s through the World Wars, the U.S., Germany and Japan were the economies that filled the vacuum left by the contraction of the role of British Capital.   In the period since the mid to late 1970s Germany, Japan, Taiwan, S. Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and China have been the main beneficiaries of Globalized Free Trade.  In the 1980s some wag noted that the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, promoted by the Japanese in the late 1930s and the early 1940s had been achieved, but the U.S. Navy patrolled the seas to enforce it so Japan was spared even that expense. 

The development of the Chinese Industrial Juggernaut has seen a major erosion of the U.S. version of the Naval (Air / Space) blockade and sea-lane control strategy.  China enjoys “interior lines” in Eurasia and is developing land surface transportation methods to replace much of the maritime movement of goods.  Of course low value goods, such as ores, bulk grains, and other bulk items, are still best transported in huge ships over the ocean surfaces.  But the Chinese have built and expanded pipeline systems to move oil and gas to China and other places in East Asia.  In addition the Chinese are building ground transportation systems of rail, both high speed passenger and conventional freight rail, and roads to connect the entire Eurasian continent with a web of rail lines and roads.  And more limited but significant work is ongoing in Africa.  These projects have been criticized as constituting a debt trap for the less developed countries that are often where they are located.  But it should not be believed that more developed countries are also included, ports in Northern Italy and Piraeus in Greece are now owned by the Chinese.  They also run the Panama Canal (the newly widened canal, renovated and expanded by Chinese engineering companies, that is again a major factor in the Global movement of goods).  Some idea of what is going on already or is planned is shown by Map 3 below.
                                                                                                     

The simple fact is that however inept and disgraceful the U.S. withdrawal and evacuation of Kabul and Afghanistan is, it is not a decisive event.  It is rather yet another milepost along the path of the declining power of the U.S.; as a new Hegemonic power, China, is moving into one area after another that the U.S. ruling class is no longer able to dominate and control.  The attempt to militarily control the mountainous, landlocked, and fiercely independent society, or better said societies, that are contained in Afghanistan was always doomed to failure.  The U.S. lost most of its economic power in East Asia and South Asia decades ago.  The loss of the mountainous and landlocked territory of Afghanistan will have no particular effect on the U.S. Navy or Air Force (or Space Force if that becomes a serious organization).  The problems that are undermining the authority of those military organizations lie much closer to home, inside the U.S.  The Chinese will continue to build the infrastructure of the Third World places and manufacture much of the industrial and high-tech products of the world.  A role very similar to that played by the U.S. during the period from the late 1800s up through perhaps the 1960s.